Arbeitspapier

Do individuals recognize cascade behavior of others?: an experimental study

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al. 1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants' probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of predecessors is not recognized.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2006,079

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
information cascade
Bayes' Rule
decision under risk and uncertainty
experimental economics
Informationsökonomik
Spieltheorie
Test
Entscheidung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grebe, Tim
Schmid, Julia
Stiehler, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Grebe, Tim
  • Schmid, Julia
  • Stiehler, Andreas
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk

Entstanden

  • 2006

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