Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: three impossibility results
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) Ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness and (3) ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound. Result (1) is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex-post efficiency; results (2) and (3) are more relevant for practical implementation than similar results in the literature. In addition, for N = 3 the paper strengthens the characterization result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001): the random serial dictatorship mechanism is the unique strategy-proof, ex-post efficient mechanism that eliminates strict envy between agents with the same preferences. (author's abstract)
- Extent
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Seite(n): 26
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
- Bibliographic citation
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten (SP II 2014-211)
- Subject
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Psychologie
Sozialpsychologie
Neid
Verhalten
Zufallsauswahl
Strategie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nesterov, Alexander S.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (where)
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Deutschland, Berlin
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST
Data provider
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nesterov, Alexander S.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2014
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Escaping the Impossibility of Fairness: From Formal to Substantive Algorithmic Fairness
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Correction to: Escaping the Impossibility of Fairness: From Formal to Substantive Algorithmic Fairness
Correction to: Escaping the Impossibility of Fairness: From Formal to Substantive Algorithmic Fairness
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