Fundraising through competition: Evidence from the lab

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that 'all-pay' competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay auctions are analyzed and ranked. Four all-pay competition mechanisms are then examined in a laboratory experiment vis-à-vis a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). All four outperform the VCM and towards the end of the experiment fully efficient outcomes are attained in the 'lowest common denominator' scheme, which is particularly accommodating for people who have a preference for cooperating conditionally on others doing their bit.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2008-11

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: public goods ; provision mechanisms ; experiments ; contests ; Öffentliches Gut ; Willingness to pay ; Spendensammlung ; Wettbewerb

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Orzen, Henrik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49659
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET