Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth

Arbeitspapier

While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions’ desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North’s desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 11/150

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Trade: General ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations ; Economic Development: General ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
• Subject: Endogenous Growth ; Intellectual Property Rights ; Trade ; Dynamic Game ; Immaterialgüterrechte ; Rechtsdurchsetzung ; Nord-Süd-Beziehungen ; Spieltheorie ; Endogenes Wachstumsmodell ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schäfer, Andreas ; Schneider, Maik T.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006578860
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171593
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET