Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games

Artikel

Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of the microscopic updating stochastic processes. This generalizes the known mean-field ordinary differential equations and provide a powerful tool to investigate the spatial effects in populations evolution. The deterministic equations allow to identify many interesting features of the evolution of strategy profiles in a population, such as standing and traveling waves, and pattern formation, especially in replicator-type evolutions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 829-874 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: Evolutionary games ; mean-field interactions ; deterministic approximation ; Kac potentials ; pattern formation ; traveling wave solutions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hwang, Sung-Ha ; Katsoulakis, Markos ; Rey-Bellet, Luc
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE829
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150210
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET