Arbeitspapier

The risk-taking channel of liquidity regulations and monetary policy

We study the implications of liquidity regulations and monetary policy on depositmaking and risk-taking. Banks give risky loans by creating deposits that firms use to pay suppliers. Firms and banks can take more or less risk. In equilibrium, higher liquidity requirements always lower risk at the cost of lower investment. Nevertheless, a positive liquidity requirement is always optimal. Monetary conditions affect the optimal size of liquidity requirements, and the optimal size is countercyclical. It is only optimal to impose a 100% liquidity requirement when the nominal interest rate is sufficiently low.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 18-15

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Imhof, Stephan
Monnet, Cyril
Zhang, Shengxing
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bern, Department of Economics
(where)
Bern
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Imhof, Stephan
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Zhang, Shengxing
  • University of Bern, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2018

Other Objects (12)