Konferenzbeitrag

Markets for Sustainable Resource Use: Auctioned Limited-Tenure Use Rights with Refunding

Efficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction ; No. A15-V2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
auctioning-refunding-mechanism
efficiency
renewable resource
stochastic model
sustainability

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Winkler, Ralph
Quaas, Martin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Verein für Socialpolitik
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Winkler, Ralph
  • Quaas, Martin
  • Verein für Socialpolitik

Time of origin

  • 2010

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