Konferenzbeitrag
Markets for Sustainable Resource Use: Auctioned Limited-Tenure Use Rights with Refunding
Efficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction ; No. A15-V2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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auctioning-refunding-mechanism
efficiency
renewable resource
stochastic model
sustainability
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Winkler, Ralph
Quaas, Martin
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Verein für Socialpolitik
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Winkler, Ralph
- Quaas, Martin
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Time of origin
- 2010