Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games

Arbeitspapier

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 11-12

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Thema: imitate-the-best ; learning ; exact potential games ; symmetric games ; relative payoffs ; zero-sum games

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Joerg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of California, Department of Economics
• (wo): Davis, CA
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58356
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ