Arbeitspapier

Preventing systemic crises through bank transparency

Banking system is known to be vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises that are caused by depositors’ coordination failure. We show that transparency regulation may prevent systemic crises by eliminating the possibility of the coordination failure. In principle, transparency regulation in our model works like the deposit insurance in the influential articles by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Matutes and Vives (1996), where the deposit insurance may prevent systemic confidence crises.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ETLA Discussion Papers ; No. 776

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
banking
disclosure
bank transparency
deposit insurance
financial safety net
Bankenkrise
Einlagensicherung
Publizitätspflicht

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hyytinen, Ari
Takalo, Tuomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hyytinen, Ari
  • Takalo, Tuomas
  • The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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