Arbeitspapier
Preventing systemic crises through bank transparency
Banking system is known to be vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises that are caused by depositors’ coordination failure. We show that transparency regulation may prevent systemic crises by eliminating the possibility of the coordination failure. In principle, transparency regulation in our model works like the deposit insurance in the influential articles by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Matutes and Vives (1996), where the deposit insurance may prevent systemic confidence crises.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ETLA Discussion Papers ; No. 776
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
banking
disclosure
bank transparency
deposit insurance
financial safety net
Bankenkrise
Einlagensicherung
Publizitätspflicht
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hyytinen, Ari
Takalo, Tuomas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)
- (where)
-
Helsinki
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hyytinen, Ari
- Takalo, Tuomas
- The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)
Time of origin
- 2001