Arbeitspapier

X-efficiency versus rent seeking in Chinese banks: 1997 - 2006

This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2006. The paper adjusts for the quality of loans by treating NPLs as a negative output. The paper shows that Chinese banks have reduced cost inefficiency and reduced X-inefficiency at a faster rate than rent-seeking inefficiency.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2008/26

Classification
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
Bank Efficiency
China
X-inefficiency
DEA.
Bootstrapping
Bank
Bankensystem
X-Effizienz
Rent Seeking
Moral Hazard
Bootstrap-Verfahren
China

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Matthews, Kent
Guo, Jianguang
Zhang, Xu
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(where)
Cardiff
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Matthews, Kent
  • Guo, Jianguang
  • Zhang, Xu
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Time of origin

  • 2008

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