Arbeitspapier
X-efficiency versus rent seeking in Chinese banks: 1997 - 2006
This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2006. The paper adjusts for the quality of loans by treating NPLs as a negative output. The paper shows that Chinese banks have reduced cost inefficiency and reduced X-inefficiency at a faster rate than rent-seeking inefficiency.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2008/26
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Subject
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Bank Efficiency
China
X-inefficiency
DEA.
Bootstrapping
Bank
Bankensystem
X-Effizienz
Rent Seeking
Moral Hazard
Bootstrap-Verfahren
China
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Matthews, Kent
Guo, Jianguang
Zhang, Xu
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (where)
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Cardiff
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Matthews, Kent
- Guo, Jianguang
- Zhang, Xu
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Time of origin
- 2008