Contract Structure, Time Preference, and Technology Adoption

Arbeitspapier

Do constraints to technology adoption vary by behavioral traits? We randomize 150 villages in Bangladesh into being offered standard microcredit, loans with a grace period, the choice between those two contracts, and control. No discernible average effects are detected on the adoption of mechanized irrigation, hybrid seeds, and chemical fertilizers. However, credit access enhances technology adoption among present-biased farmers, whose output and profits increase. These effects are driven by the standard contract and choice villages, as present-biased farmers select out of the grace period contract. This suggests offering commitment and screening applicants on present bias to enhance agricultural technology adoption.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13590

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving ; Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products ; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes ; Agricultural Finance ; Agricultural R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
• Thema: microfinance ; technology adoption ; time inconsistency ; Bangladesh

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chowdhury, Shyamal ; Smits, Joeri ; Sun, Qigang
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224032
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ