Minimum Wages and Union Bargaining in a Dual Labour Market

Arbeitspapier

The paper analyses the links between a binding minimum wage and union bargaining. A dual labour market model is developed where the first sector outcome is characterised by bargaining between unions and firms, while in the second sector firms have to pay a statutory minimum wage. It is shown that a minimum wage increase has negative employment effects only if the bargaining outcome is described by the Nash solution. However, this result does not hold if the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is applied to model union bargaining. A higher minimum wage can then lead to more employment in the unionised sector and to a lower unemployment rate.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 13/07

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
• Thema: Minimum wages ; union bargaining ; Nash approach ; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ; Mindestlohn ; Beschäftigungseffekt ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Mehr-Sektoren-Modell ; Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dittrich, Marcus
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften
• (wo): Dresden
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22754
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ