A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs

Arbeitspapier

Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine-mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equilibria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Papers on Economics and Evolution ; No. 0506

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
• Thema: games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs ; limiting average reward ; equilibria ; renewable common-pool resources ; Allmenderessource ; Erneuerbare Ressourcen ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Joosten, Reinoud
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems
• (wo): Jena
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ