Arbeitspapier

Rebels without a clue? Experimental evidence on partial cartels

This paper provides experimental evidence on the formation of partial cartels with endogenous coordination. Firms face a coordination challenge when a partial cartel is to be formed as every firm is better off if it is not inside the cartel but is a free-riding outsider. We introduce a three-stage mechanism with communication which facilitates the formation of a cartel and respectively allows the formation of a partial cartel. All-inclusive cartels are always formed. We find that partial cartels are frequently rejected out-of-equillibrium if moutside firms profit excessively from the formation of the cartel.

ISBN
978-3-86304-068-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 69

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
Partial Cartels
Coordination
Communication
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Clemens, Georg
Rau, Holger A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Clemens, Georg
  • Rau, Holger A.
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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