Arbeitspapier
Enforcement of labor regulation and informality
Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5902
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
informality
labor regulation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Almeida, Rita K.
Carneiro, Pedro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201108152092
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Almeida, Rita K.
- Carneiro, Pedro
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Enforcement of labor regulation and informality
Conceptualising informality: regulation and enforcement
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality
Informality, labor regulation, and the business cycle
Imperfect law enforcement, informality, and organized crime
Conceptualising informality: regulation and enforcement
Enforcement and the Effective Regulation of Labor
Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance
Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance
Chasing informality: Evidence from increasing enforcement in large firms in Peru
Labor informality and market segmentation in Senegal
Labor Informality and Market Segmentation in Senegal
Enforcement of labor regulation and informality
Conceptualising informality: regulation and enforcement
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality
Informality, labor regulation, and the business cycle
Imperfect law enforcement, informality, and organized crime
Conceptualising informality: regulation and enforcement
Enforcement and the Effective Regulation of Labor
Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance
Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance
Chasing informality: Evidence from increasing enforcement in large firms in Peru
Labor informality and market segmentation in Senegal
Labor Informality and Market Segmentation in Senegal
Enforcement of labor regulation and informality
Conceptualising informality: regulation and enforcement
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality
Informality, labor regulation, and the business cycle
Imperfect law enforcement, informality, and organized crime
Conceptualising informality: regulation and enforcement
Enforcement and the Effective Regulation of Labor
Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance
Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance
Chasing informality: Evidence from increasing enforcement in large firms in Peru
Labor informality and market segmentation in Senegal