Arbeitspapier

Blackwell's ordering and public information

We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (1971) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Thema
Blackwell's Ordering
Information
Risk Sharing
Informationsökonomik
Allokation
Informationswert
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Campbell, Colin M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
(wo)
New Brunswick, NJ
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Campbell, Colin M.
  • Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

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