Arbeitspapier
Blackwell's ordering and public information
We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (1971) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-06
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
- Subject
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Blackwell's Ordering
Information
Risk Sharing
Informationsökonomik
Allokation
Informationswert
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Campbell, Colin M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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New Brunswick, NJ
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Campbell, Colin M.
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2002