Effect of Enforcement Shock on Pushers' Activities: Evidence from an Asian Drug-Selling Gang

Arbeitspapier

We study a Singaporean drug-selling gang's dataset and empirically find that the gang's pushers purchased larger quantities of drugs during periods of enforcement shocks caused by enforcement activities targeting the gang's drug supply chain. This counter-intuitive finding can be explained by the pushers' profit targeting behavior. Given that enforcement shocks increased the pushers' cost of drugs, pushers must compensate by purchasing more drugs to sell in order to reach their profit targets.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12083

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Informal Labor Markets ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Thema: crime ; enforcement ; labor supply

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Leong, Kaiwen ; Li, Huailu ; Xu, Haibo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193377
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ