Credence goods markets, distributional preferences and the role of institutions

Arbeitspapier

We study credence goods markets where an expert not only cares for her own monetary payoff, but also for the monetary payoff of her customer. We show how an expert with heterogeneous distributional preferences responds to monetary incentives in the absence of institutions, under liability and/or verifiability and identify optimal contracts for an expert with distributional preferences in each of these settings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2012-11

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: other-regarding preferences ; credence good ; institution ; contract theory ; industrial organization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Erharter, Dominik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73876
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET