Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests

Arbeitspapier

Contests are meant to attract the best performers and incentivize high effort, however, they may also attract cheaters who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role of self-selection in contests with a possibility of lying in a real effort task. Contrary to common wisdom, we do not find evidence that contests disproportionately attract intrinsic cheaters. However, we find that contests fail at selecting the best performers, as no difference is observed in the actual or perceived ability of those who selected into the contest versus those who selected into a comparable noncompetitive pay scheme.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2016-29

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Design of Experiments: General
• Subject: contest ; cheating ; entry ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dutcher, E. Glenn ; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela ; Ryvkin, Dmitry
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156183
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET