School choice in Guangzhou: Why high-scoring students are protected?

Artikel

Each year, millions of middle school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for high school positions. Unlike other cities, Guangzhou still uses the immediate acceptance mechanism but implements a policy that students in the high-scoring group receive their allocations before those in the low-scoring group. In this paper, we study a class of the Guangzhou mechanisms, including the immediate acceptance (IA) and the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism. We show that, if a collection of groups is refined by splitting its groups into a larger number of smaller subgroups, then the Guangzhou mechanism will perform more stably and less manipulable than before. This result provides a tool for policy makers to improve the allocation outcome of the IA mechanism under homogeneous priorities and justifies the use of a high-scoring student protection policy in Guangzhou's high school admission.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-12 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: immediate acceptance mechanism ; school choice ; test score

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fang, Yuanju
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g12020031
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257513
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ