Arbeitspapier
A simple mechanism for the roommate problem
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the roommate problem. The mechanism is successful in determining the reason of instability in our game scenario. And, we show that our mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the instance of instability.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 975
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Evci, Bora
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4100
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Evci, Bora
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2014
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