Arbeitspapier
Decentralization of industrial policy as strategic delegation
What is the appropriate degree of centralization in the context of industrial policy? The basic advantage of centralization results from internalization of external effects. While most of the literature stresses the superior information of regional authorities as a countervailing force, the present paper discusses another argument in favor of decentralization: Delegation of authority to regional governments will improve the position of the home country in the policy game with a foreign government. In a linear Cournot oligopoly with two domestic regions delegation is shown to be profitable if the domestic industry comprises at least twice as many firms as the foreign industry.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe ; No. 193
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
- Thema
-
Decentralization
Strategic delegation
Industrial policy
Oligopoly
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Morasch, Karl
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
- (wo)
-
Augsburg
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Morasch, Karl
- Universität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Entstanden
- 2000