Artikel

Opacity, liquidity and disclosure requirements

We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. We show that while low‐opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity. High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of private information. The cross‐section of bid–ask spreads of US firms is shown to be broadly consistent with this hump‐shaped relationship between opacity and illiquidity. Our analysis suggests that uniform disclosure standards may be suboptimal; efficient disclosure can instead be achieved through a two‐tier standard system or by subsidizing voluntary disclosure.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting ; ISSN: 1468-5957 ; Volume: 49 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 5-6 ; Pages: 658-689 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Management
Subject
asymmetric information
disclosure requirements
liquidity
opacity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Stenzel, André
Wagner, Wolf
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1111/jbfa.12574
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Stenzel, André
  • Wagner, Wolf
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2021

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