Arbeitspapier

A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-use, and Repo Intermediation

We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in states where collateral value is high and maximizes borrowing capacity when it is low. Haircuts increase both with counterparty risk and asset risk. In equilibrium, lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and generates a "collateral multiplier" effect. Finally, we show that intermediation by dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6579

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: Other
Thema
repos
collateral multiplier
limited commitment
intermediation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gottardi, Piero
Maurin, Vincent
Monnet, Cyril
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gottardi, Piero
  • Maurin, Vincent
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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