Arbeitspapier

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3137

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Thema
rational expectations equilibrium
strategic complementarity
multiplicity of equilibria
asymmetric information
risk exposure
bedging
supply information
Effizienzmarktthese
Anlageverhalten
Rationale Erwartung
Gleichgewicht
Informationsverhalten
Lernprozess
Asymmetrische Information
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Manzano, Carolina
Vives, Xavier
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Manzano, Carolina
  • Vives, Xavier
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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