Arbeitspapier
Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution
The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1370
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Social Security and Public Pensions
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Thema
-
flexible retirement
asymmetric information
actuarial fairness (neutrality)
mechanism design
Flexible Altersgrenze
Versicherungstechnik
Asymmetrische Information
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Second Best
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Simonovits, András
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Simonovits, András
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2004
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