Arbeitspapier

Labor enforcement and formal employment: The effects of communication and punishment

We evaluate the effects of a large-scale enforcement intervention on formal labor flows. The initiative combined a communication component (an official letter/e-mail sent to registered employers) and a punishment component (face-to-face inspections). Using two identification strategies (regression discontinuity design - RDD and difference-in-differences - DiD) we isolate the effects of each component keeping the other constant. Results show that both components increased the formalization of previous informal workers but did not change regular, formal labor demand. Effects are observed only for the short run, indicating that employers reacted to each component in the aftermath of the intervention and then moved back to their usual compliance behavior.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Texto para Discussão ; No. 2977

Classification
Wirtschaft
Labor Standards: Public Policy
Informal Labor Markets
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Subject
enforcement intervention
labor inspection
formal employment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Foguel, Miguel Nathan
Corseuil, Carlos Henrique
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)
(where)
Brasília
(when)
2024

DOI
doi:10.38116/td2977-eng
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Foguel, Miguel Nathan
  • Corseuil, Carlos Henrique
  • Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)

Time of origin

  • 2024

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