Artikel
Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative to conventional mechanisms. We analyze this limited commitment environment as a standard mechanism design problem with an additional "credibility" constraint, requiring that every outcome be interim-optimal conditional on available information. We investigate how such intermediaries communicate with the parties, analyze the tradeoffs they face, and study the bounds on what they can achieve.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1655-1714 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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Intermediation
mechanism design
imperfect commitment
asymmetric information
bilateral trade
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Eilat, Ran
Pauzner, Ady
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE3703
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Eilat, Ran
- Pauzner, Ady
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2021