Arbeitspapier

Whole versus Shared Ownership of Foreign Affiliates

This paper studies why multinational firms often share ownership of a foreign affiliate with a local partner even in the absence of government restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i) the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts that the multinational?s ownership share is increasing in its productivity, with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2007-18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
Foreign direct investment
ownership
joint venture
productivity
Multinationales Unternehmen
Direktinvestition
Joint Venture
Asymmetrische Information
Produktivität
Eigentümerstruktur
Schätzung
Theorie
Japan

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stähler, Frank
Ryan, Michael
Raff, Horst
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Stähler, Frank
  • Ryan, Michael
  • Raff, Horst
  • Kiel University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

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