Equilibrium computation in discrete network games

Artikel

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game-theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that a particular action is a dominant strategy. These agents can be used to partition the network into smaller subgames whose equilibrium sets may be more feasible to compute. We provide bounds on the complexity of our algorithms for models obeying certain restrictions on the strength of strategic interactions. These restrictions are analogous to the assumption in the widely used linear-in-means model of social interactions that the magnitude of the endogenous peer effect is bounded below one. For these models, our algorithms have complexity Op(nc), where the randomness is with respect to the data-generating process, n is the number of agents, and c depends on the strength of strategic interactions. We also provide algorithms for computing pairwise stable and directed Nash stable networks in network formation games.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1325-1347 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models ; Econometrics of Games and Auctions ; Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Thema: Multiple equilibria ; graphical games ; network formation ; empiricalgames

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Leung, Michael P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/QE1386
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253593
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ