Artikel

How do women managers avoid paying bribes?

Previous studies have found that firms where women have greater influence are less likely to pay bribes than other firms. In this study, we ask how these firms avoid paying bribes. Using data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, we find that firms run by women avoid meeting and interacting with government officials when they can. Female-managed firms, for example, are less likely to apply for construction and import licenses, less likely to meet with tax officials, and less likely to bid for government contracts than male-managed firms. However, female-managed firms are no less likely to say that officials sought bribes when they met with them than male-managed firms. This suggests the main way that firms with women in positions of power avoid paying bribes is by avoiding situations where officials might seek them.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Economies ; ISSN: 2227-7099 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-18 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
corruption
bribes
firm behavior
enterprise surveys

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Clarke, George R. G.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3390/economies9010019
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Clarke, George R. G.
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2021

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