Arbeitspapier

Vertical Foreign Direct Investment: Make, Sell and (Not) Buy

According to conventional wisdom, multinational firms undertake vertical FDI in order to take advantage of cross-border factor cost differences and source the inputs from abroad at better terms. Recent empirical findings though document that this is not always the case. We provide theoretical support to the latter by demonstrating that when there is transfer of intangible assets between a multinational’s vertically related production plants, its parent firm can engage in vertical FDI in order to improve its cross-threat and its input sourcing terms domestically and not abroad as well as in order to exploit its intangible assets in another country. We also investigate the effects of trade liberalization and the welfare consequences of vertical FDI.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6190

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Organization of Production
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Multinational Firms; International Business
Subject
international trade
vertical FDI
inputs
trade liberalization
intangible assets
two-part tariffs

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Milliou, Chrysovalantou
Sandonís, Joel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Milliou, Chrysovalantou
  • Sandonís, Joel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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