Arbeitspapier
Vertical Foreign Direct Investment: Make, Sell and (Not) Buy
According to conventional wisdom, multinational firms undertake vertical FDI in order to take advantage of cross-border factor cost differences and source the inputs from abroad at better terms. Recent empirical findings though document that this is not always the case. We provide theoretical support to the latter by demonstrating that when there is transfer of intangible assets between a multinational’s vertically related production plants, its parent firm can engage in vertical FDI in order to improve its cross-threat and its input sourcing terms domestically and not abroad as well as in order to exploit its intangible assets in another country. We also investigate the effects of trade liberalization and the welfare consequences of vertical FDI.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6190
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Organization of Production
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Subject
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international trade
vertical FDI
inputs
trade liberalization
intangible assets
two-part tariffs
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Milliou, Chrysovalantou
Sandonís, Joel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Milliou, Chrysovalantou
- Sandonís, Joel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2016