Democracy and compliance in public goods games

Arbeitspapier

I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants' contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 17-038

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: laboratory experiment ; public good ; democracy ; endogenous institutions ; voting ; contribution rule ; compliance

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gallier, Carlo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170492
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-435755
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET