Arbeitspapier
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
We study an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determine the organization\'s aggregate efficiency. Under centralization, eliciting the agents\' private information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information for the organization. Under delegation, the principal concedes more information rent, but is able to use the agents\' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralization is optimal when such likelihood is low. Delegation, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 105
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
agency
aggregate information
organization design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Celik, Gorkem
Shin, Dongsoo
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
-
München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Celik, Gorkem
- Shin, Dongsoo
- Strausz, Roland
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2018
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
Organizational dynamics and aggregate fluctuations: The role of financial relationships
Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures
Aggregate shocks or aggregate information? Costly information and business cycle comovement
Information flows and aggregate persistence
The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures
Collusion with private and aggregate information
How organizational hierarchy affects information production
Individual income, incomplete information, and aggregate consumption
Local Information and Firm Expectations about Aggregates
Organizational Redesign, Information Technologies and Workplace Productivity
Organizational redesign, information technologies and workplace productivity
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
Organizational dynamics and aggregate fluctuations: The role of financial relationships
Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures
Aggregate shocks or aggregate information? Costly information and business cycle comovement
Information flows and aggregate persistence
The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures
Collusion with private and aggregate information
How organizational hierarchy affects information production
Individual income, incomplete information, and aggregate consumption
Local Information and Firm Expectations about Aggregates
Organizational Redesign, Information Technologies and Workplace Productivity
Organizational redesign, information technologies and workplace productivity
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
Organizational dynamics and aggregate fluctuations: The role of financial relationships
Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures
Aggregate shocks or aggregate information? Costly information and business cycle comovement
Information flows and aggregate persistence
The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures
Collusion with private and aggregate information
How organizational hierarchy affects information production
Individual income, incomplete information, and aggregate consumption
Local Information and Firm Expectations about Aggregates
Organizational Redesign, Information Technologies and Workplace Productivity