Arbeitspapier

Incentives through Inventory Control in Supply Chains

The paper shows that taking inventory control out of the hands of competitive of exclusive retailers and assigning it to a manufacturer increases the value of a supply chain especially for goods whose demand is highly volatile. This is because doing so solves incentive distortions that arise when retailers have to allocate inventory across sales periods, and thus allows for better intertemporal price discrimination. Assigning inventory control to a manufacturer is also shown to have effects on total inventory and social welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: KCG Working Paper ; No. 7

Classification
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
Subject
inventory
supply chain
demand uncertainty
storable good
price discrimination

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Qu, Zhan
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Qu, Zhan
  • Raff, Horst
  • Schmitt, Nicolas
  • Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG)

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)