Arbeitspapier

Incentives through Inventory Control in Supply Chains

The paper shows that taking inventory control out of the hands of competitive of exclusive retailers and assigning it to a manufacturer increases the value of a supply chain especially for goods whose demand is highly volatile. This is because doing so solves incentive distortions that arise when retailers have to allocate inventory across sales periods, and thus allows for better intertemporal price discrimination. Assigning inventory control to a manufacturer is also shown to have effects on total inventory and social welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: KCG Working Paper ; No. 7

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
Thema
inventory
supply chain
demand uncertainty
storable good
price discrimination

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Qu, Zhan
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG)
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Qu, Zhan
  • Raff, Horst
  • Schmitt, Nicolas
  • Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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