Arbeitspapier
Incentives through Inventory Control in Supply Chains
The paper shows that taking inventory control out of the hands of competitive of exclusive retailers and assigning it to a manufacturer increases the value of a supply chain especially for goods whose demand is highly volatile. This is because doing so solves incentive distortions that arise when retailers have to allocate inventory across sales periods, and thus allows for better intertemporal price discrimination. Assigning inventory control to a manufacturer is also shown to have effects on total inventory and social welfare.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: KCG Working Paper ; No. 7
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
- Subject
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inventory
supply chain
demand uncertainty
storable good
price discrimination
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Qu, Zhan
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG)
- (where)
-
Kiel
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Qu, Zhan
- Raff, Horst
- Schmitt, Nicolas
- Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG)
Time of origin
- 2017