Arbeitspapier

Preferences, intentions, and expectations: a large-scale experiment with a representative subject pool

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socioeconomic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player's disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3022

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Inequity aversion
intentions
subjective expectations
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit
Meinung
Wahrnehmung
Verhandlungstheorie
Test
Niederlande

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bellemare, Charles
Kröger, Sabine
van Soest, Arthur
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bellemare, Charles
  • Kröger, Sabine
  • van Soest, Arthur
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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