Arbeitspapier

Stakeholders' aversion to inequality and bank lending to minorities

We find that banks differ in their propensity to lend to minorities based on their stakeholders' aversion to inequality. Using mortgage application data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, we document a large and persistent cross-sectional variation in banks' propensity to lend to minorities. Inequality-averse banks have a higher propensity to lend to borrowers in high-minority areas and, within census tracts, to non-white borrowers compared to other banks. This higher propensity (i) is not explained by selection of applicants, (ii) allows these banks to retain and attract their inequality-averse stakeholders, and (iii) does not predict worse ex-post loan performance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Staff Report ; No. 1079

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Subject
inequality aversion
mortgage lending
minority borrowers
racial discrimination

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Crosignani, Matteo
Le, Hanh
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.59576/sr.1079
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Crosignani, Matteo
  • Le, Hanh
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Time of origin

  • 2023

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