Reputation concerns in risky experimentation

Arbeitspapier

We develop a general model, with the exponential bandit as a special case, in which high-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success but also learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model in which the single-crossing condition fails but a double-crossing property holds. We characterize the unique D1 equilibrium under double-crossing condition, and show that it tends to produce pooling. Ability to identify good projects and ability to execute a good project have different implications for the equilibrium allocation. Our model also incorporates public news, which generates dynamic distortions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1060

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Thema: double-crossing property ; D1 equilibrium refinement ; dynamic signaling ; venture startups

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chen, Chia-hui ; Ishida, Junichiro ; Suen, Wing-chuen
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230466
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ