Arbeitspapier

Strategic Experimentation with Poisson Bandits

We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable. As the belief process is piece-wise deterministic, payoff functions solve differential-difference equations. There is no equilibrium where all players use cut-off strategies, and all equilibria exhibit an '€˜encouragement effect' relative to the single-agent optimum. We construct asymmetric equilibria in which players have symmetric continuation values at sufficiently optimistic beliefs yet take turns playing the risky arm before all experimentation stops. Owing to the encouragement effect, these equilibria Pareto dominate the unique symmetric one for sufficiently frequent turns. Rewarding the last experimenter with a higher continuation value increases the range of beliefs where players experiment, but may reduce average payoffs at more optimistic beliefs. Some equilibria exhibit an '€˜anticipation effect': as beliefs become more pessimistic, the continuation value of a single experimenter increases over some range because a lower belief means a shorter wait until another player takes over.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 260

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Subject
Strategic Experimentation
Two-Armed Bandit
Poisson Process
Bayesian Learning
Piecewise Deterministic Process
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Differential-Difference Equation
Spieltheorie
Markovscher Prozess
Stochastischer Prozess

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Keller, Godfrey
Rady, Sven
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13292
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13292-5
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Keller, Godfrey
  • Rady, Sven
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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