Putting on a tight leash and levelling playing field: An experiment in strategic obfuscation and consumer protection

Arbeitspapier

The paper reports the results of an experiment where asymmetric sellers of a product can obfuscate the market. We show that policy measures may have unintended effects of increasing obfuscation incentives. We find that policies that limit the effectiveness of obfuscation and policies that promote parity between firms can lead less prominent firms to increase their obfuscation efforts. Despite this unintended effect, however, the former type of policies is effective in boosting consumer welfare.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-191-5
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 192

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Consumer Protection ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Experiment ; Obfuscation ; Consumer Protection ; Behavioural Industrial Organisation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gu, Yiquan ; Wenzel, Tobias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112784
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET