Arbeitspapier

The endowment effect as blessing

We study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. We suggest that the "endowment effect" and the "winner's curse" could have jointly survived natural selection together. We develop a new family of "hybrid-replicator" dynamics. Under such dynamics, biases survive in the population for a long period of time even if they only partially compensate for each other and despite the fact that the rational type's payoff is strictly larger than the payoffs of all other types.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017-06

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Endowment Effect
Winner's Curse
Bounded Rationality
Evolution

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Frenkel, Sivan
Heller, Yuval
Teper, Roee
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(where)
Ramat-Gan
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Frenkel, Sivan
  • Heller, Yuval
  • Teper, Roee
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)