Arbeitspapier
Human capital and optimal redistribution
We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic family model with human capital. We show how a government can improve the trade-off between equality and incentives by changing the amount of observable human capital. We provide an intuitive decomposition for the wedge between human-capital investment in the laissez faire and the social optimum. This wedge differs from the wedge for bequests because human capital carries risk: its returns depend on the non-diversifiable risk of children's ability. Thus, human capital investment is encouraged more than bequests in the social optimum if human capital is a bad hedge for consumption risk.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 497
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- Thema
-
human capital
optimal taxation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koeniger, Winfried
Prat, Julien
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
- (wo)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-356112
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koeniger, Winfried
- Prat, Julien
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Entstanden
- 2014