Arbeitspapier

Human capital and optimal redistribution

We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic family model with human capital. We show how a government can improve the trade-off between equality and incentives by changing the amount of observable human capital. We provide an intuitive decomposition for the wedge between human-capital investment in the laissez faire and the social optimum. This wedge differs from the wedge for bequests because human capital carries risk: its returns depend on the non-diversifiable risk of children's ability. Thus, human capital investment is encouraged more than bequests in the social optimum if human capital is a bad hedge for consumption risk.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 497

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Thema
human capital
optimal taxation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koeniger, Winfried
Prat, Julien
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-356112
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koeniger, Winfried
  • Prat, Julien
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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