Arbeitspapier

Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountability. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations. These findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2836

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Korruption
Gemeindefinanzen
Öffentliche Finanzkontrolle
Informationsverhalten
Wahlverhalten
Brasilien

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ferraz, Claudio
Finan, Frederico
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2007

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008032753
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ferraz, Claudio
  • Finan, Frederico
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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