Arbeitspapier

Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountability. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations. These findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2836

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Korruption
Gemeindefinanzen
Öffentliche Finanzkontrolle
Informationsverhalten
Wahlverhalten
Brasilien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ferraz, Claudio
Finan, Frederico
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2007

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008032753
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ferraz, Claudio
  • Finan, Frederico
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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