On Two-Period Committee Voting: Why Straw Polls Should Have Consequences

Konferenzbeitrag

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information about the state of the world, have to make a binary decision. We investigate incentives for truthful revelation of their information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000 shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their preferences are homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that heterogeneous committees have strictly higher incentives to reveal information and can be strictly better off if the straw poll allows for an earlier decision for high level of consensus.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Political Economy II ; No. B21-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Frommeyer, Tim
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112806
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET