Arbeitspapier

Credit crunches from occasionally binding bank borrowing constraints

We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the counter-cyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristic of the credit crunches observed in the data.

ISBN
978-3-95729-543-9
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 57/2018

Classification
Wirtschaft
Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Subject
Occasionally binding constraints
Credit crunches
Financial crises
Spreads
Dividends
Equity
Banking

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Holden, Tom D.
Levine, Paul
Swarbrick, Jonathan M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Holden, Tom D.
  • Levine, Paul
  • Swarbrick, Jonathan M.
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Time of origin

  • 2018

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