Arbeitspapier
Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behavior
We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others' behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others' dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals' beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 21-025
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Subject
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Laboratory experiment
theory
cheating
monetary incentives
information on others' behavior
lying costs
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Le Maux, Benoît
Masclet, David
Necker, Sarah
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Le Maux, Benoît
- Masclet, David
- Necker, Sarah
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Time of origin
- 2021