Deflecting my burden, hindering redistribution: How elites influence tax legislation in Latin America

Arbeitspapier

This paper proposes to understand a singular but salient factor that enables the wealthy to deflect their tax burden downwards: elites' political leverage to shape legislation via their capacity to influence political actors and policy outcomes. The analysis sheds light on alternative mechanisms used by economic elites over time and space. Our analysis of the political economy of taxing upper-income groups in Chile and Uruguay reveals the importance of continuous political agency on the part of organized elite interest groups. Our results show how even centre-left parties competing on a redistributive programmatic platform confront and concede to the interests of wealthy elites, especially when sustained interaction between political leaders and economic elites becomes routinized in the long run.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-92-9256-135-2
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2016/92

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Economic Methodology: General
• Subject: tax policy ; Latin America ; elites ; tax avoidance ; redistribution ; case study

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bogliaccini, Juan A. ; Luna, Juan Pablo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2016

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2016/135-2
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146286
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET