Two-part access pricing and imperfect competition

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers a vertically separated industry with an upstream monopolist who supplies an essential input to two downstream Cournot firms. This situation is relevant to a number of sectors, including the telecommunications industry where trunk operators must have access to the local network of an incumbent firm to provide their long-distance service. The paper analyses two-part access pricing and input price discrimination under different regulatory settings, and it finds that discrimination may produce adverse welfare effects when it is practised by the unregulated upstream firm.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 34.1998

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Economics of Regulation ; Telecommunications
• Subject: Access pricing ; Input price discrimination

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Valletti, Tommaso M.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154892
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET