Arbeitspapier
How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy
This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are infuenced by electoral incentives. We develop a two dimensional political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the incumbent should manipulate the secondary policy to attract voters. We test our model by using panel data on environmental policy choices in the U.S. states. In contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2006-3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
elections
environmental policy
lobbying
term limits
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
John A., List
Daniel, Sturm
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.768
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-768-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- John A., List
- Daniel, Sturm
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2006