Arbeitspapier

How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are infuenced by electoral incentives. We develop a two dimensional political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the incumbent should manipulate the secondary policy to attract voters. We test our model by using panel data on environmental policy choices in the U.S. states. In contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2006-3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Thema
elections
environmental policy
lobbying
term limits

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
John A., List
Daniel, Sturm
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.768
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-768-5
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • John A., List
  • Daniel, Sturm
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2006

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